Introduction
Islamophobia is in many ways similar to racism. Just as racism
justifies the oppression of and discrimination against certain peoples on the
grounds that they are inferior to the oppressors, Islamophobia, as defined by
the Runnymede Trust in 1997, justifies the oppression of Muslims on the grounds
that they adhere to a religion – Islam – that is seen as a monolithic bloc,
static and unchanging, irrational, sexist, violent and aggressive. While use of
the term ‘Islamophobia’ has been criticised by Salman Rushdie, Christopher Hitchens
and others who argue that it is ‘often used to silence the critics of Islam,
including Muslims fighting for reform in their own communities,’ Meera Nanda
defends its use to describe ‘prejudice against Islam itself as somehow
singularly evil and backward as compared to other religions’ (Nanda 2011:63).
She also notes the convergence between European Islamophobia and the Hindutva
Right in India with the formation of the organisation ‘The Voice of India’, set
up in Delhi in 1981 and cited repeatedly in the manifesto of Norwegian mass
murderer Anders Breivik, whose mantra – ‘the problem is not Muslims but Islam
itself’ – encapsulates this view.
Racism and Islamophobia are characteristics of the political Right,
and even in their milder forms are conducive to the growth of the far Right. It
goes without saying, therefore, that revolutionary socialists must oppose them.
The term ‘fundamentalism’ is actually a misnomer, since there are, in
the case of every religion, basic disagreements about what fundamentalists
claiming allegiance to it regard as ‘fundamental,’ and what progressives
claiming allegiance to the same religion regard as fundamental. Nonetheless,
the term has now passed into common usage, and will therefore be used here in
its accepted sense. The object of faith, for fundamentalists, is clearly
defined, absolute, and cannot be questioned. It therefore provides a stable
point of reference in a world that is otherwise changing rapidly, creating all
manner of insecurities. This characteristic of fundamentalism has led to its
being explained as a response to capitalism and modernity: a clinging to
certainty in a world where, in the words of the Communist Manifesto, ‘All that
is solid melts into air’. In Karen Armstrong’s words, ‘Fundamentalists will
often express their discontent with a modern development by overstressing those
elements in their tradition that militate against it. They are all – even in
the United States
– highly critical of democracy and secularism. Because the emancipation of
women has been one of the hallmarks of modern culture, fundamentalists tend to
emphasise conventional, agrarian gender roles, putting women back into veils
and into the home’ (Armstrong 2001: 141).
Thus fundamentalism is a very specific type of response to capitalism
and modernity: a reactionary response. Its purpose is to provide
justification and reinforcement for the domination of those who have traditionally
exercised power within a community: men, religious leaders, community elders,
and so on. It speaks for the oppressors whose power to oppress is being challenged
by modernity and especially by democracy. It is therefore politically
right-wing. It is important to distinguish between religious fundamentalism
(which is not necessarily violent) and the political use of fundamentalism
(which almost always is); but the abdication of the right and responsibility to
think and make moral judgments for oneself makes fundamentalists easily
manipulable by right-wing political leaders.